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The Right to Life During Armed Conflict:




During its brief military intervention in Grenada in October 1983,
the United States bombed a mental institution, killing sixteen patients
and injuring six. 1 On November 5, 1983, Disabled Peoples' Inter-
national (DPI)2 filed a complaint against the United States with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission)3 on be-
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
University of Minnesota Law School, Class of 1988.
1. Petition Submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Disabled
Peoples' International, Human Rights Committee, and International Disability aw, Inc. on
Behalf of Unnamed, Unnumbered Residents, Both Living and Dead, of the Richmond Hill
Insane Asylum, Grenada, West Indies (Nov. 5, 1983) at 1-2 [hereinafter Petition of DPI]. See
also W. GILMORE, THE GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION 32 (1984);
U.S. Officer's Briefing: New Report on Grenada, S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1983, at 22, col. 1.
2. Disabled Peoples' International (DPI) is a nongovernmental organization representing
advocacy groups of and for disabled people in 75 countries. In addition to advocating the rights
of the disabled, DPI works to develop self-help training seminars, exchanges, and other projects
for disabled people. HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET, HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY, NORTH AMERICA
94 (1984). DPI's efforts in this case have been supported by the J. Roderick McArthur
Foundation.
3. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is an autonomous organ of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS), charged with promoting respect for human rights. The
Commission derives its authority from the Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr.
30, 1948, arts. 51, 112, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by
Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S.
324 [hereinafter OAS CHARTER], and the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, arts. 31-51, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.K./XVIII. 1, doc. 65 rev. I corr. 1 (1970) (entered into
force July 18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]. The
Commission examines communications alleging violations of human rights obligations contained
in the American Convention and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OAS Res. XXX, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.L./V/I.4 (1963) (adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States, March 30-May 2, 1948), reprinted in T. BUERGENTHAL, R.
NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 333 (2nd ed. 1986)
[hereinafter American Declaration].
Only those states which have ratified the American Convention are bound by its provisions.
The U.S. signed the American Convention and President Carter transmitted it to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification, but the Senate has yet to act on that request. Buergenthal,
Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 439, 440 (T. Meron ed. 1984). All members of the OAS, even
those not signatories to the American Convention, are bound by the OAS Charter, the American
Declaration, and the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1960 Annual
Report of the OAS Secretary General, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.D./III. 12, at 19-21 (1961), reprinted in
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half of the "unnamed, unnumbered residents, both living and dead,
of the Richmond Hill Insane Asylum, Grenada, West Indies."4 The
complaint alleged an "unjustified violation of the right to life, liberty
and security of the person pursuant to article 1 of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man" (American Declaration). 5
In April 1986, the Commission found the DPI petition admissible.
6
This case is the first in which the Commission has found a prima facie
violation of the American Declaration by the United States. 7 Depend-
ing on how it construes the factual circumstances surrounding the
bombing of the mental institution, the Commission could ultimately
find that the bombing violated the mental patients' right to life and
L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION O HUMAN
RIGHTS 194 (1973).
According to the Commission's Statute, a petition need not be presented by the victim or
the victim's representatives, but may be presented by any person, group, or nongovernmental
organization. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra, art. 1; ice
also Cerna, The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311, 316 n. 1
(1987).
4. Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id. at 1. Article 1 of the American Declaration provides: "Every human being has the
right to life, liberty and the security of his person." American Declaration, supra note 3, art.
1. DPI also alleged a violation of article 11 of the American Declaration because of unsanitary
living conditions at the bombed hospital. Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at 3-4. Article I1
reads: "Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and social
measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by public
and community resources." American Declaration, supra note 3, art. 11. DPI has since amended
its petition to request compensation only for the mental and physical damage resulting from the
attack. The organization concedes that since the time of the initial filing, the U.S. has provided
the government of Grenada with funds and materials for the care of the patients at the Richmond
Hill Asylum. Letter from Disabled Peoples' International to the Inter-American Commission on-
Human Rights (Feb. 4, 1986) at 5 [hereinafter Letter from DPI, Feb. 1986]. See also Treaster,
Since the Invasion, A Grenada in Flux, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1987, § 4, at 3, col. 2 (a new
mental institution has been built in Grenada with funds provided by the U.S.).
6. Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, Case 9213 (United States), INTER-Amt.
C.H.R., OAS Doc. OEA/ser.L.IV/II.67, doc. 6 (1986). Complaints submitted to the Commis-
sion must set forth a prima facie case that a violation of one of the rights enumerated in the
American Declaration or the American Convention has occurred. Farer & Rowles, The Intcr-
American Commission on Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE
47, 60 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978). If a petition does not state facts that constitute a violation of the
American Declaration or American Convention, the Commission must declare the case inad-
missible. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 38, reprintcd
in T. BUERGENTHtAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra note 3, at 355, 361 [hereinafter
Regulations].
7. Weissbrodt, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds Application Against U.S.
Admissible, Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 1, 2. In 1981, the Commission
determined that U.S. laws and policies on abortion did not violate article 1. That decision
contained no formal finding on admissibility. Case of Baby Boy, Case 2141 (United States),
INTER-AM. C.H.R., OAS Doc. OEA/ser.L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981), reprinted in 2 HUMt.
RTs. L.J. 110 (1981) [hereinafter Baby Boy]. In March 1987, the Commission found that the
U.S. violated article 1 of the American Declaration by permitting executions of juveniles. The
Commission released its decision on admissibility and on the merits in the same resolution.
Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647 (United States), INTER-AM. C.H.R., OAS
Doc. OEA/ser.L.IVIII.69, doc. 17 (1987) [hereinafter Roach].
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hold the United States government responsible for the resulting in-
juries and deaths.8
On October 25, 1985, the United States launched an attack on a
complex in the capital city of St. George's which included two forts,
Fort Matthew and Fort Frederick, as well as several other buildings. 9
Fort Matthew housed the Richmond Hill Insane Asylum at the time
of the attack. Another building within the complex housed the Rich-
mond Hill Prison. Located nearby were Fort Frederick and other old
mental institution offices. 10 While the United States anticipated a
fairly simple military exercise in Grenada, troops loyal to the Revo-
lutionary Military Council, assisted by a substantial number of Cuban
"construction workers," put up a surprisingly spirited resistance. I The
United States military, asserting that its forces "took fire" from Peo-
ples' Revolutionary Army (PRA) soldiers using buildings near Fort
Matthew as their headquarters,12 ordered an A-7 attack aircraft from
the USS Independence to terminate the resistance coming from the
alleged PRA military command post. A bomb from the A-7 struck
Fort Matthew. 13
8. If the Commission makes an adjudicatory finding against the U.S., it can recommend that
the U.S. government pay damages to the victims or take other appropriate measures. If the
U.S. fails to do so, the Commission can report its finding to the OAS General Assembly. It is
possible that the OAS could then condemn the U.S. for violations of the American Declaration.
Article 20 of the Commission's Statute spells out the full extent of its powers:
In relation to those member states of the Organization that are not Parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Commission shall have the following powers . . . :
a. to pay particular attention to the observance of the human rights referred to in Article
I, II, III, IV, XVIII, XXV, and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man;
b. to examine communications submitted to it and other available information, to address
the government of any Member State not a Party to the Convention for information deemed
pertinent by this Commission, and to make recommendations to it, when it finds this
appropriate, in order to bring about more effective observance of fundamental human rights;
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 20.
9. Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at 2.
10. The U.S. described the fort complex in the following terms:
The mental institution at issue here was located at Richmond Hill, St. George's, Grenada,
in a single compound that includes two forts, Fort Matthews and Fort Frederick. The
building housing the mental institution was in the Fort Matthews portion of the compound.
On October 25, 1983, the PRA was using a group of buildings located inside the
battlements between Fort Frederick and Fort Matthews as one of its regional headquarters,
housing armed PRA members and serving as a command post for PRA forces. That group
of buildings was only 143 feet away from the mental institution.
Letter from U.S. Dep't of State to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Sept.
21, 1984) at 2 [hereinafter Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Sept. 1984].
11. W. GiLMORE, rupra note 1, at 36. The Revolutionary Military Council was made up of
radical elements which took control of the country after assassinating Prime Minister Maurice
Bishop. See The priming of the Grenada grenade, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1983, at 17.
12. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Sept. 1984, supra note 10, at 3.
13. U.S. Officer's Briefing: New Report on Grenada, supra note 1.
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While it is not disputed that the bomb hit the mental institution,
many of the surrounding details are still uncertain. Beyond the factual
discrepancies, this case also presents a unique challenge in that the
Commission has been called on to determine whether the right to life
provision in article 1 of the American Declaration extends to civilian
victims of an armed conflict. The Commission has considered the right
to life in the context of abortion and the execution of juvenile offenders
in the United States, 14 but never in a situation of armed conflict.
DPI has requested the Commission to interpret article 1 in light of
principles of humanitarian law. Many difficult issues come to the
forefront when human rights law and humanitarian law overlap.
Should the rights in the American Declaration be applicable in time
of war? Does article 1 warrant a literal interpretation, creating an
absolute right to life regardless of the surrounding circumstances?
Whose lives must a state preserve during an armed attack? The
application of the right to life in this case raises more complex ques-
tions than the Commission may have anticipated when it found the
matter admissible. 15
This article first examines the admissibility phase of the dispute
and concludes that the Commission has apparently expanded the ju-
risdictional reach of the American Declaration. Second, it suggests an
analytical approach to the interpretation of the American Declaration
that refers to the principles of humanitarian law. Finally, the article.
discusses how the Commission could apply the American Declaration
to the specific circumstances of the military operation in Grenada in
light of the relevant principles of humanitarian law.
II. ADMISSIBILITY
The United States failed in several attempts to dismiss the case on
both procedural and substantive grounds. Its main procedural argu-
ment was that DPI had failed to meet the requirement of exhaustion
14. See Baby Boy, supra note 7 (abortion); Roach, supra note 7 (execution of juvenile offenders).
15. The Commission could circumvent an analysis of the right to life provision by determining
that the special program established by the U.S. to compensate those who suffered damage
during the invasion discriminated against the victims of the bombing based on their mental
handicap. See infra note 25. Article 2 of the American Declaration states that all persons are
equal before the law "without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed, or any other factor."
American Declaration, supra note 3, art. 2. In its admissibility decision, the Commission held
that the special compensation program was inadequate because of its ad hoc nature as well as
the refusal of the U.S. to seek out the victims of the bombing to assist them in filing claims.
Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, supra note 6, at 13. See infra text accompanying
note 27.
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of local remedies. 16 The major substantive objection advanced by the
United States was that the Commission does not have the competence
to interpret and apply humanitarian law without the express consent
of each state involved.17 In deciding in favor of admissibility, the
Commission found that the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies
should be waived and implicitly held that the Commission has the
competence to interpret article 1 of the American Declaration to
conform with principles of customary international law."' The Com-
mission's admissibility decision also signals an apparent expansion of
the jurisdictional scope of the American Declaration.
A. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Article 37(1) of the Commission's regulations stipulates that "for a
petition to be admitted by the Commission, the remedies under
domestic jurisdiction must have been invoked and exhausted in ac-
cordance with the general principles of international law."19 The Com-
mission may waive this requirement, however, in three situations: 1) if
the domestic legislation of the state oncerned does not afford due
process of law for the protection of the rights allegedly violated; 2) if
the party alleging the violation has been denied access to remedies
under the domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them;
or 3) if there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a final
judgment under the domestic law.20
In its first formal communication with the Commission, DPI pre-
sented three arguments in support of its request that the Commission
waive the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. 2' First, DPI
16. The U.S. also requested dismissal on the theory that the petition "failed to identify any
of the 'unnamed, unnumbered residents' on whose behalf the petition is purportedly filed, in
contravention of Article 29 of the Commission's regulations." Letter from U.S. Dep't of State,
Sept. 1984, supra note 10, at 1. Petitions to the Commission must include an account of the
act or situation, specifying the date and place of the violations, and if possible, the names of
the victims. Regulations, supra note 6, art. 32(b). DPI responded by sending a delegation to
Grenada which subsequently provided the Commission with the identities of the sixteen persons
who were killed and six who were injured. Letter from DPI to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (Jan. 10, 1985) at 1-2 [hereinafter Letter from DPI, Jan. 1985]. In a
subsequent communication, DPI reiterated its intention to represent "any unnamed injured
mental patients who are no longer at the &cility and who have yet to be located and identified."
Comments on Respondent Government's Reply, Submitted by Disabled Peoples' International
(Feb. 8, 1985) at 12 [hereinafter Comments of DPI]. Apparently satisfied, the U.S. did nor
respond, and the Commission subsequently found that the procedural defects had been corrected.
Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, supra note 6, at 1.
17. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Aug. 26, 1985) at 2 [hereinafter Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Aug. 1985].
18. Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, supra note 6, at 13.
19. Regulations, supra note 6, art. 37(1).
20. Id., art. 37(2)(a)-(c).
21. Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at 4.
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claimed that no remedy was available in Grenada. Not only was DPI
unable to find counsel willing to represent the victims, but no judicial
system existed in Grenada when the petition was filed. 22 "The judicial
system of Grenada was in complete disarray. . . .Even at the time of
Petitioners [sic] mission of inquiry one year later, judges from other
English-speaking Caribbean States were being imported.1
23
Second, DPI asserted that it could not bring a suit in the United
States because, as an organization whose membership did not include
the Grenadian victims, it failed to meet standing requirements under
United States law.2 4 DPI also cited the Foreign Claims Act and the
War Claims Act as statutory bars to any claims in United States courts
arising out of military actions.
25
Finally, DPI stressed that the victims' mental incompetence meant
they were unable to assert their rights. 26 In essence, DPI argued that
no compensation program could provide an adequate remedy if the
burden of applying fell to the dead or injured mental patients.
The Commission apparently decided to waive the exhaustion of local
remedies requirement based on DPI's third argument:
[Gliven the ad hoc nature of the United States compensation
program, the evident failure of the United States Government to
contact these incapacitated victims, and the unwillingness of the
22. Letter from DPI, Feb. 1986, supra note 5, at 4; Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at
12. According to Amnesty International, the Governor-General assumed authority for the civil
government of Grenada after October 25, but he did nor vest full legal and political powers in
an interim civilian administration until November 15, 1983. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL RE-
PORT 156 (1984). See alto W. GIuLome, supra note 1, at 95 (letter from Sir Paul Scoon,
Governor-General of Grenada, to Prime Minister Adams of Barbados, stating that the govern-
ment in Grenada had ceased to function after the takeover by the Revolutionary Military Council).
23. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 10. DPI may not have been aware that judges and
lawyers in the English-speaking Caribbean often work in different countries of the region.
24. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 9 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (abstract social interests are not sufficient to maintain an action); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (plaintiffs must show injury in fact and a causal connection
to the challenged action); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (plaintiffs must
have actual injuries in order to sue)).
25. Id. See Foreign Claims Act, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (1942) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2734
(1982)); War Claims Act, ch. 826, 62 Stat. 1240 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 2001 (1982)).
In response, the U.S. argued that the victims could have submitted their claim by way of a
special temporary claims procedure established to compensate individuals and public entities for
damage incurred during the military operation. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Aug. 1985,
supra note 17, at 4. The adequacy of this remedy, however, remains in question. One report on
the compensation and reconstruction program states that "[by] Christmas [of 1983], thousands
of requests for compensation had been received but only 250 were approved, at a total cost of
$115,000. All these payments related to destruction caused by US forces when not engaged in
combat; Washington refused to accept that it should pay for any damage caused by fighting
whether by its forces or not." F. AMBURESLY & J. DUNKERLEY, GRENADA: WHOSE FREEDOM?
101 (1984).
26. Letter from DPI, Jan. 1985, supra note 16, at 1-2.
1988 / The Right to Life During Armed Conflict
United States Government to compensate these victims subse-
quent to the expiration of the ad hoc compensation program, ...
the Commission . . . concludets] that the domestic remedies
could not be invoked and exhausted so as to render the provision
of Article 37(2)(a) applicable. 27 .
B. The Commission's Competence
The United States government's major substantive argument during
the admissibility stage centered on the Commission's competence to
decide an issue of humanitarian law. The United States Department
of State asserted that as a general principle of international law, an
organization such as the Commission has no authority to decide a
particular issue without the express consent of each state involved. 28
The United States argued that the Commission is an inappropriate
organ to apply humanitarian law as urged by DPI: "Only if it con-
cluded that the United States had violated the law of armed conflict
could the Commission find in petitioners' favor. Because the OAS
member States did not consent to the Commission's jurisdiction over
that subject, the petition must be dismissed. 29
This argument, taken literally, probably articulates a correct state-
ment of the Commission's competence. Unlike the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the Commission has no express authority to
make direct interpretations of treaty law other than the American
Convention and the American Declaration. 30
DPI, however, does not ask the Commission to apply directly
treaties concerning humanitarian law. Rather it asks the Commission
to construe article 1 of the American Declaration "in conformity with
other relevant international rules protecting the human person." 31 The
Commission thus would not be making a judgment based on human-
itarian law, but would use humanitarian law principles as a method
27. Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, supra note 6, at 13.
28. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Aug. 1985, supra note 17, at 2 (citing Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 18, 32 (Preliminary
Question of June 15)).
29. Id.
30. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) does have the
authority to examine documents outside of the OAS system. Article 64 of the American
Convention allows member states to consult with the Inter-American Court "regarding the
interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights
in the American States." American Convention, supra note 3, art. 64.
The Inter-American Court has held that the "other treaties" clause allows it to consider iny
universal treaty that directly relates to the protection of human rights in an OAS member state.
INTER-AM. COURT H.R., "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Article
64, American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, at 32, para. 21 (Sept.
24, 1982), reprinted in 3 HUM. RTs. L.J. 140 (1982) [hereinafter "Other Treaties"].
31. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 3.
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of interpreting the applicability of article 1 of the American Decla-
ration during armed conflict.
32
Even though the American Declaration was not initially promul-
gated as a treaty,33 it has become incorporated by reference into the
OAS Charter by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 34 As Judge Buergenthal
has observed, "[tlhe human rights provisions of the American Decla-
ration can today consequently be deemed to derive their normative
character from the OAS Charter itself."3 5
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention) 36 provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of its terms in light of the treaty's object
and purpose. 37 Also pertinent to treaty interpretation are "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties. 38
The ordinary meaning of the phrase "every human being has the
right to life" in article 1 of the American Declaration can be interpreted
as prohibiting government officials from arbitrarily taking the life of
anyone. Yet the language of article 1 does not make clear whether a
government is responsible for civilian lives taken during the aerial
32. DPI also suggested that the Commission could decide the case without even mentioning
the armed conflict. Letter from DPI, Feb. 1986, upra note 5, at 2. Without considering the
factual circumstances of the bombing, however, the Commission would be pressed into a finding
that any and all killing is a violation of article l's right to life. This interpretation would ignore
the realities of armed conflict and the principles of humanitarian law which allow the killing of
enemy combatants. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
33. M. MONROY CABRA, Los DERiEcHos HUMANOS 103 (1980).
34. Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 112, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847,
721 U.N.T.S. 324 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1970).
35. Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 Am. J. INT'L
L. 828, 835 (1975).
36. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, entered intoforce Jan. 27, 1980, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
On November 22, 1971, President Nixon transmitted the Vienna Convention to the U.S.
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, but the Senate has not yet taken any action. In
its letter of submittal to the President, the U.S. Department of State indicated that the Vienna
Convention is "already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice." S. ExEc. Doc. No. Y1/I:L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
37. Vienna Convention, stupra note 36, art. 31(1). Since the Inter-American Court has used
the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention as its sole guide for construing the American
Convention, it is not unreasonable that the Commission should follow the Inter-American
Court's example in interpreting the American Declaration. INTER-AM. COURT H.R., Government
of Costa Rica (In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo, et al.), Opinion G-101181 Set. A, at 84, para.
20 (Nov. 13, 1981); "Other Treaties", supra note 30, at 22, para. 33; INTER-AM. COURT H.R.,
Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Articles 4(2) and 4(4), American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Ser. A, No. 3, at 58, para. 48 (Sept. ,8, 1983). The proposition
that the Commission should follow the canons of interpretation in the Vienna Convention was
first advanced by Dinah Shelton in Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American Syterm: The
Case of "Baby Boy", 2 Hums. RTS. L.J. 309, 313 (1981).
38. Vienna Convention, sapra note 36, arts. 31(3)(c), 32(a).
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bombing of an allegedly armed fortress. 39 In conformity with the
Vienna Convention, this question may be resolved by taking into
account the relevant obligations of customary humanitarian law which
bind the United States.
In fact, the Commission has previously construed the American
Declaration in light of relevant international instruments in reports
on human rights in Nicaiagua, Argentina, and El SalvadorA0 In
addition, in its most recent decision in Roach and Pinkerton v. United
States,41 the Commission referred to customary international law in
determining that the absence of a federal prohibition in the United
States on the execution of juveniles violates article I of the American
Declaration.42
Hence, although the Commission did not directly address the issue
of its competence in the admissibility phase, its past practice and its
decision to accept jurisdiction over the DPI case clearly indicate that
39. The American Declaration contains nothing regarding derogation from the right to life
during armed conflict. The American Convention expressly disallows derogation from the right
to life "[i]n time of war, public danger or other emergency." American Convention, supra note
3, art. 27, para. 2.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is
the only international human rights instrument in which derogation from the right to life
during armed conflicts is expressly permitted, but the derogation is very limited and implicitly
incorporates the norms of humanitarian law. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15, para. 2, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention) (no derogation from the right to life "except in respect to
deaths from lawful acts of war"). See Redelbach, Protection of the Right to Life By Law and By
Other Means, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 182, 207 (B. Ramcharan ed.
1985). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits "arbitrary" deprivation
of life, but it makes no specific reference to derogation from the right to life during war.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). See
Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS 72, 83 (L.
Henkin ed. 1981).
40. In a 1978 report on human rights in Nicaragua, the Commission pointed out that armed
combatants must respect the noncombatant population, noting that this obligation is specified
in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to which Nicaragua has been a party since 1953.
INTER-AM. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.L./
V11.45, doc. 16 rev. 1, at 31-32 (1978). In its 1980 report on Argentina, the Commission
discussed the right to life in the context of a state's attempt to regain public order and found
that "(t]hese measures are proscribed in constitutions and in international instruments, both at
the regional and at the global level." INTER-AM. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Argentina, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.L./V/II.49, doc. 19 cor. 1, at 26-27 (1980). The Commission's
1981-82 report on El Salvador stated that "the Commission is not unaware that there have been
serious violations of human rights by both sides in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions."
INTER-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc.
OEA/ser.L./V/II.57, at 116, para. 2 (1982).
41. Seesupra note 7.
42. Roach, supra note 7, at 31-35. In particular, the Commission cited Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (judgment of Dec. 18) and Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Judgment
of Feb. 5), as well as the Vienna Convention, supra note 36.
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the Commission believes it has the competence to interpret the Amer-
ican Declaration in light of customary norms of international human-
itarian law.
C. Expansion of the Scope of the American Declaration
Neither party raised the issue of whether the American Declaration
obligates the United States to protect the human rights of people
outside its jurisdiction. It is unclear whether the American Declaration
could possibly govern United States military actions occurring outside
of United States territory.
The language of the American Convention suggests that a state's
human rights obligations extend only to persons within its jurisdic-
tion. 43 If this same language were found in the American Declaration,
the United States would arguably have no duty to protect the right
to life of Grenadian citizens in Grenada.
Unlike the American Convention, however, the American Decla-
ration focuses on the rights of individuals rather than on the obliga-
tions of states. The preamble to the American Declaration recites that
the members of the OAS "recognized that the essential rights of man
are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are
based upon the attributes of the human personality. '" 44 Since mem-
bership in the OAS obligates a state to guarantee the rights articulated
in the American Declaration 45 and these rights belong to every human
being found within an OAS member state, it could be argued that a
member state's duty to protect human rights does not stop at its
borders, but extends to any place in the hemisphere where that state
is affecting the lives of individuals. 46
Since the Commission did not expressly consider this issue in its
admissibility decision, it is not possible to determine whether the
Commission intends to recognize an expanded jurisdictional reach for
the American Declaration. The import of its admissibilty decision,
however, does indicate such an expansive approach. This broad inter-
43. Article 1 of the American Convention obligates states to "ensure to all persons subject to
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights [enumerated in this Convention]."
American Convention, supra note 3, art. 1 (emphasis added).
44. American Declaration, supra note 3, preamble.
45. Baby Boy, supra note 7, at 13; Roach, supra note 7, at 29-30.
46. Article 3(j) of the OAS Charter supports the argument that each of the member states
recognizes the fundamental rights of all individuals. It reads: "The American States proclaim
the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or
sex." OAS CHARTER, supra note 3, art. 3(j). Article 16 of the OAS Charter proclaims that each
state must respect these rights: "Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political, and
economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of
the individual and the principles of universal morality." Id., art. 16. Neither article contains
any language which would limit the geographical scope of the state's obligation.
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pretation would dictate that the United States, as a member of the
OAS, may not act in a manner inconsistent with the mandates of the
American Declaration, even if its actions occur outside the territory
of the United States. 47
III. INTERPRETING THE RIGHT TO LIFE DURING ARMED
CONFLICT IN LIGHT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A broad reading of the jurisdictional scope of the American Dec-
laration does not, however, lead logically to a broad interpretation of
article 1. The language of this provision simply states that every
human being "has the right to life, liberty, and the security of the
person." 48 A literal reading of article 1 would create an absolute right
to life regardless of the circumstances. It seems difficult to imagine
that the American Declaration forbids the taking of soldiers' lives in
combat. It seems equally implausible, however, that the American
Declaration sets no limits to the killing of innocent people during
armed conflict.
The United States was correct in arguing that the Commission does
not have the authority to find that the United States directly violated
a particular provision of a treaty bearing on humanitarian law. The
Commission does, however, have the power to take into consideration
other relevant information, including principles of customary inter-
national law, in interpreting the American Declaration. 49 To lend
more precision to the vague language of article 1, the Commission
should interpret the American Declaration in light of the well-settled
principles of humanitarian law.
International law distinguishes four types of armed conflicts to
which different principles and instruments of humanitarian law apply:
1) international armed conflicts to which the Hague Conventions, the
47. The obligation to protect persons outside a state's jurisdiction mdy be inherent in the
duty to protect human rights during armed conflicts. While peacetiri human rights impose
duties either on all states or only on the state of which an individual is a national, humanitarian
law often imposes a duty on states of which the individual is not a national. Dinstein, Human
Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law, in 2 HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: LEGAL AND PoLIcuy IssuEs 345, 354 (T. Meron ed. 1984). The European Commission on
Human Rights has interpreted the jurisdictional language of the European Convention in this
manner. The words "within their jurisdiction" in article I ("The High Contracting Parties shall
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.") have been construed by the European Commission to mean "actual authority and
responsibility." Cyprus v. Turkey, 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 118 (Eur. Comm'n
on Hum. Rts.). So long as the element of responsibility exists, a state remains subject to human
rights obligations for acts of its agents. Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, supra note 39, at 77.
48. American Declaration, supra note 3, art. 1.
49. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Geneva Protocol I of 1977,
and other legal principles apply; 2) wars of liberation or self-deter-
mination which are principally defined by and made subject to the
Geneva Protocol I of 1977; 3) noninternational armed conflicts which
are subjected to the regulation of common Article 3 in the four Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949 and some customary norms; and
4) noninternational armed conflicts which are narrowly defined and
regulated by the Geneva Protocol II of 1977.
The short "rescue mission" in Grenada, as it is called by the United
States Departments of State and Defense, was not considered a situa-
tion which warranted a formal declaration of war because of the
temporary nature of the operation and the lack of an opposing party
which "constituted a government."50 While arguably not warranting
a declaration of war, there is little doubt that the operation in Grenada
was an international armed conflict. The authoritative Red Cross
commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 defines an interna-
tional armed conflict as any "difference arising between two states and
leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces .. .even
if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes
no difference how long the conflict lasts, or . . the number of
victims. ' 1 The United States military action in Grenada lasted only
a few days, but the hostilities involved several states, both directly
and indirectly. As a result, the Commission should look to the cus-
tomary principles of humanitarian law applicable to international
armed conflicts in order to interpret the right to life provision of the
American Declaration.
One of the basic legal norms applicable to international armed
conflict is the principle of military necessity.5 2 The essence of this
principle is that a belligerent is justified in applying the amount and
kind of force necessary to achieve the complete submission of the
50. Letter from the U.S. Dep't of State, Sept. 1984, supra note 10, at 2, (citing U.S. DEP'TS
OF STATE & DEFENSE, GRENADA: A PREuMINARY REPORT (1983)); see aho Lessons Learned as
a Result of the U.S. Military Operation in Grenada: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984) (statement of Hon. Fred C. IkI, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy).
51. J. PICTET, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PRO-
TECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 32 (1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTION IV]. Jean Picter, former Director-General of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, took charge of the preparatory work of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. His
four-volume commentary is considered the authoritative source of the Geneva Convention's
legislative history. See STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED
CROSS PRINCIPLES xxii-xiii (C. Swinarski ed. 1984) [hereinafter STUDIES AND ESSAYS].
52. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of the Additional
Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 115 (1985).
1988 / The Right to Life During Armed Conflict
enemy at the earliest possible moment and with the least expenditure
of time, life, and resources. 53
The principle of military necessity was first codified in 1863 in the
Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States
in the Field (Lieber Code):
XIV. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized na-
tions, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indis-
pensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful
according to the modern law and usages of war. 
4
As the definition in the Lieber Code clearly, suggests, however,
military necessity does not exempt combatants from all legal limita-
tions on their actions during time of war. One widely accepted limi-
tation on behavior during armed conflict is the principle of propor-
tionality. The principle of proportionality holds that the destruction
of a military objective must not be effected at the price of dispropor-
tionate suffering among the civilian population."
It has . . . been understood that, in directing attacks against
military objectives, some incidental injury to civilians . . . is
likely, at times, to result. Accordingly, the law has interposed
the further requirement, under what is commonly termed the
"Rule of Proportionality," that attacks against military objectives
cannot be made when the injury to civilians and damage to civilian
property [that] is likely to occur is out of proportion to the
military advantage reasonably expected to be gained.5 6
It is often difficult to apply the principles of military necessity and
proportionality in specific cases. But a third principle of humanitarian
law, the principle of distinction, has evolved into a much more detailed
restriction on military necessity. The principle of distinction dictates
that civilians and civilian objects must be treated differently from
53. See M. BOTH, K. PARTSCH & W. SoLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
196 (1982).
54. U.S. Dep't of War, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States
in the Field by Order of the Secretary of War, General Orders No. 100, art. XIV (1863),
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d rev. ed. 1981)
[hereinafter Lieber Code]; see also Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities under
Customary International Law and Under Protocol 1, 1 Am. UJ. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 117, 121 (1986).
55. Solf & Grandison, International Humanitarian Law Applied in Armed Conflict, 10 J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 567, 583 (1979).
56. Id. at 583. See also E. ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 12 (1979).
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combatants.5 7 A belligerent is expected to "execute his military op-
erations in a manner which enables a distinction to be made at all
times between unlawful and lawful targets."58s
Several international instruments embody the principle of distinc-
tion. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions articulate a prohibition
on the attack or bombardment of undefended towns or buildings." 9
This limitation provides civilians with the right to be free from attack
so long as they do not take an active part in the hostilities.
The Geneva Conventions of 194960 likewise reiterate the principle
of distinction, particularly in the Fourth Convention, which deals with
57. E. ROSENBLAD, supra note 56, at 63. See also G. HERCZEGH, DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 139 (1984) (the principle of distinction is the cardinal
point of protection for civilians); J. PICTET, DEVELOPMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA.
TiONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 52 (1985) (the principle of distinction arose in the 16th century
and became established in the 18th century). U.S. military manuals reiterate this principle:
"The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
attack." UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW - THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFUCT AND AIR OPERATIONS 110-31 (1976). Austrian, German, and Swiss military manuals
similarly prohibit attacks directed against civilians and their dwellings in order to destroy morale
and the enemy's will to fight. See E. ROSENELAD, supra note 56, at 136.
58. E. ROSENBLAD, Supra note 56, at 63.
59. Hague Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the
Convention (1899), art. 25, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention
(II)] (prohibiting the "attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings,
or buildings which are undefended"); Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Annex to the Convention (1907), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907
Hague Convention (IV)] (reiterating the prohibition of article 25 of the 1899 Hague Convention);
Hague Convention (IX) Respecting Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War, art. 1, 36
Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention (IX)] (prohibiting bombardment
by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings). The U.S. ratified
the 1899 Hague Convention (11) on April 9, 1902, and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and
Hague Convention (IX) on January 26, 1910. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 301
(1987).
The 1907 Hague Convention (IX) was applied during the Turco-Italian War of 1911-12,
World War I (bombardment of English coastal towns by German naval forces found to be
inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Hague Convention because the bombardment
affected the civilian population and had no strictly military purpose), and World War II.
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAws OF WAR 93 (A. Roberts & R. Guelff eds. 1982). See also D'Amato,
The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1129 (1982). See
generally Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Am. J. INT'L LAW 348, 364-70
(1987).
60. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered intofore Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter First Convention]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Second
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Third Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth
Convention]. The U.S. ratified the four Geneva Conventions on August 2, 1955. Multilateral
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protection of civilians during time of war.6 1 Articles 14 through 23
specify that civilian hospitals and places housing the sick and wounded
are immune from attack. 62 However, article 19 provides that a civilian
hospital shall lose its immunity if it is used to commit acts harmful
to the enemy.6 3 Protection may only cease, however, after due warning
has been given by the attacking party.64
Even though the Fourth Convention exclusively addresses the treat-
ment of civilians, 65 it does not provide adequate protection for non-
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at December 31, 1985, at 3-6, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/4 (1986), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 59,
at 330.
61. A proposed preamble to the Fourth Convention read in part:
Respect for the personality and dignity of human beings constitutes a universal principle
which is binding even in the absence of any contractual undertaking. Such a principle
demands that, in time of war, all those not actively engaged in the hostilities and all those
placed hr de combat by reason of sickness, wounds, capture, or any other circumstance,
shall be given due respect and have protection from the effects of war.
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, REMARKS AND PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: DOCUMENT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF GOVERNMENTS
INVITED BY THE Swiss FEDERAL COUNCIL TO ATTEND THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF
GENEVA 8 (1949).
.The preamble was not included in the Convention because of objections to language referring
to the divine origin of man. According to Jean Pictet, "the essential motive which had brought
sixty-four nations together at Geneva was left unexpressed solely on account of non-essential
additions that one delegation or another wished to make." COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION IV, supra note 51, at 14.
62. Fourth Convention, supra note 60, arts. 14-23.
63. Id., art. 19. DPI has argued that the mental institution's status as a civilian hospital
gave it legal protection from attack. Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at 6. It appears doubtful,
however, that the Richmond Hill Asylum qualifies as a "civilian hospital" within the meaning
of the Fourth Convention. Article 18 defines "civilian hospitals" in narrow terms and lays down
a series of strict conditions for their protection. Civilian hospitals are to be provided by the
states which are parties to the conflict with certificates showing that they are civilian hospitals
and that the buildings which they occupy are not used for any purpose which would deprive
them of protection under article 19. In addition, the belligerent parties are to take necessary
steps to mark civilian hospitals with distinctive emblems clearly visible to the enemy. Fourth
Convention, supra note 60, art. 18. The preferable line of argument for DPI would be that the
building was an institution housing civilians, and, as such, qualified as a civilian object. Letter
from F. Kalshoven to D. Weissbrodt (Nov. 3, 1987) at 3-4. See infra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text.
64. Fourth Convention, supra note 60, art. 19. DPI also relies on the Fourth Convention,
and, in particular, on article 32, to support the argument that the right to life isjus cogens and
is therefore protected even in states of emergency or war. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at
4. Article 32 reads in part: "The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them
is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or
extermination'of protected persons in their hands." This article states a principle common to
the four Geneva Conventions. See First and Second Conventions, supra note 60, art. 12; Third
Convention, id., art. 13. This language does not, however, support DPI's argument. As noted
in the official commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the phrase "protected persons
in their hands" refers only to enemy civilians actually in the custody of a party to a conflict and
does not apply to individuals who suffer as a result of an enemy attack. COMMENTARY TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 51, at 222.
65. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAws OF WAR, supra note 59, at 271. The Fourth Convention
expressly excludes from coverage those persons protected by the First, Second, and Third Geneva
Conventions. Fourth Convention, supra note 60, art. 4.
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combatants in the modern era of high-technology warfare. 66 This gap
in the Fourth Convention was not filled until 1977, when a Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Conference)
adopted two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(Protocols I and II).67
Protocol I, in addition to reaffirming the general principle of dis-
tinction, 6s details the protections to be afforded to civilians during
hostilities. The most sweeping provision of Protocol I is article 51,
66. Roberts, supra note 52, at 120. See also Erickson, Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and
Geneva Laws of Armed Conflict, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 557, 558 (1979) (changes in the nature of
conflict since the end of World War II raised serious doubts about the previously separate rules
of Hague and Geneva Law). The scope of civilian immunity during an aerial bombing may have
been purposely excluded from the Fourth Convention. In his commentary to the Fourth Con-
vention, Jean Pictet states:
[Tihe main object of the Convention is to protect a strictly defined category of civilians
from arbitrary action on the part of the enemy, and not from the dangers due to the
military operations themselves. Anything tending to provide such protection was system-
atically removed from the Convention.
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 51, at 10 (emphasis in original).
The main purpose of the Fourth Convention is to protect civilians in enemy hands. As the
history of the Fourth Convention shows, protection of civilians during attack was carefully
placed outside the terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Letter from F. Kalshoven to D.
Weissbrodt (Nov. 3, 1987) at 3.
The 1923 Hague Rules do address aerial bombing:
1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to
say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military
advantage to the belligerent.
2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following objec-
tives: military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-known
centres engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition, or distinctively military supplies;
lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes.
1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare (Draft), art. 24, General Report of the Commission of
Jurists at the Hague, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 245 (1923). The Hague Rules, however, never
entered into force.
67. Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex 11 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol
I]; Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, id. As of December 31, 1986,
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had been ratified by 162 nations, Protocol I by 55 nations,
and Protocol II by 48 nations. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL
REPORT 1985, at 87 (1986). For additional insight into the codification process of the two
protocols, see Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of she 1977 Protocols, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS,
supra note 51, at 129; Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts: The Conference of Government Experts, 2 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 68 (1971); Kalshoven,
Second Session of the Conference of Government Experts, 3 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 18 (1972); Kalshoven,
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The
Diplomatic Conference (1974-77), 8 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 106 (1977).
68. In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and ac-
cordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 48. See also H. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 81 (1986).
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which states that civilians enjoy "general protection against dangers
arising from military operations." 69 Starting from this general prin-
ciple, the Conference codified bans on direct or indiscriminate attacks
on civilian populations. 70 Article 51(4) describes an indiscriminate
attack as an attack "of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction."'1 It goes on to give
specific examples of indiscriminate attacks:
(a) one which is not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) one which employs a method or means of combat the effects
of which candot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) one which employs a method or means of combat which, by
its nature, strikes military objectives and civilians without
distinction.72
u
Protocol I defines military objectives as "those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military objective." 73 Civilian objects are defined by exclusion as all
objects that do not fall within the definition of military objectives. 74
Protocol I goes on to state that if there is any doubt about whether a
civilian object is being used "to make an effective contribution to
military action," thus removing its immunity from attack, "it shall
be presumed not to be so used."7 5
The commanding officer in charge of a military operation is obli-
gated to verify that its objectives are neither civilians nor civilian
objects. 76 Moreover, the commander is required to take all feasible
precautions to minimize or avoid collateral civilian casualties or dam-
69. Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 51(1). Jean Pictet commented on the origin of this
protection: "Such general immunity of the civilian population developed from customary law
and general principles, but had not been expressly stated in positive law. This has now been
accomplished." J. PicTrT, DEVELOPMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW, supra note 57, at 72.
70. 2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object
of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time
as they take a direct part in hostilities.
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited ...
Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 51(2)-(4). See also J. PscrET, DEVELOPMENTS AND PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw, supra note 57, at 53-58.
71. Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 51(4).
72. Id.
73. Id., art. 52(2).
74. Id., art. 52(1).
75. Id., art. 52(3).
76. Id., art. 57(2Xi).
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age to civilian objects. 77 The belligerent must give advance warning
where an attack may affect the civilian population unless the necessity
of surprise precludes such warning. 78
While Protocol I thus places a heavy burden of care upon attackers
to ensure that their military actions do not harm civilians unnecessar-
ily, it also imposes duties on defenders to protect civilians. The party
controlling the civilian population should endeavor to evacuate civil-
ians from the vicinity of military objects, to avoid locating military
objectives within or near densely populated areas, and to take any
additional precautions to protect the civilian population against the
dangers resulting from military operations. 79
Even though Protocol I has not been ratified by the United States,80
to the extent that the humanitarian principles embodied within it -
and within the Hague and Geneva Conventions before it - are
reaffirmations of existing customary law, those principles can be used
by the Commission in interpreting the right to life provision of the
American Declaration. 81
77. Id., art. 57(2)(ii)-(iii).
78. Id., art. 57(2)(c).
79. Id., art. 58.
80. On January 29, 1987, President Reagan transmitted Protocol II to the Geneva Conven-
tions to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification, but in the same correspondence
he stated: "The United States cannot ratify a second agreement on the law of armed conflict
negotiated during the same period. I am referring to Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which would revise the rules applicable to international armed conflicts." Message
from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational
Armed Conflicts Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, TREATY Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong,,
1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 91 (Feb. 2, 1987). The reasons
given for refusing to ratify Protocol I include the automatic treatment of "wars of national
liberation" as international conflicts, the grant of special status to these wars, and the grant of
combatant status to irregular forces. Id. at 92. See also Roberts, supra note 52, at 170 n.321
(Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense have recommended that Protocol I be
rejected).
The U.S. rejection of Protocol I apparently had nothing to do with the provisions protecting
civilians. The President reaffirmed his support for "traditional humanitarian law" and for "the
positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed
by parties to international armed conflict." 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 92 (Feb. 2, 1987).
For a view supporting ratification, see Gasser, An Appealfor Ratification by the United States, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 914 (1987) (Protocol I codifies customary principles of the laws of war).
81. See supra notes 33-42, 49 and accompanying text. According to the International Law
Commission, the factors to be considered in determining whether a legal norm has entered the
realm of customary international law are:
(a) a concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of situation falling
within the domain of international relations;
(b) a continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time;
(c) a conception that the practice is required by or consistent with prevailing international
law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice of other states.
[19501 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMAM'N 26, para. 11, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/.1950.
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. The regulations of the Hague Conventions have long been recog-
nized as principles of customary humanitarian law.8 2 In 1946, the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg rejected the argument
that the Hague Conventions were not binding on Germany, holding
that "by 1939 these rules laid down in the [1907 Hague] Convention
[IV] were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."
' 3
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are likewise "widely accepted in
the international community and have acquired the status of customary
international law."'8 4 The provisions of the Conventions were followed
in practice by United States forces during the Korean War (1950-
53), even before formal United States ratification.8 5 The International
Court of Justice has recently affirmed that the Geneva Conventions of
1949 are the expression of fundamental general principles of human-
itarian law.8 6
Protocol I contains elements that cannot be considered declarative
of customary international law.8 7 But its provisions on distinction and
proportionality and its prohibition on indiscriminate attack are reaf-
firmations of principles that have been expressed in international legal
documents and writings since the time of Grotius. 8 Protocol I gives
more explicit content to these norms - for example, by providing a
formal definition of military objective in article 52 - but the basic
principles are ones that the Conference itself recognized as having long
ago passed into customary international law.8 9 The Commission can
82. Meron, Human Rights in Time of Peace and in Time of Armed Sirife, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1984). For i outline of the historical
development of restraints on warfare and their acceptance as customarv i9w, see Solf, supra note
54, at 118-31.
83. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 5'dR THE TRIAL OF GERMAN
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, Cmd. 6964, at 64-65 (1946).
84. Meron, supra note 82, at 5; Roberts, supra idote 52, at 114.
85. Roberts, supra note 52, at 109 n.2 (citing 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 93-94 (1962) (Pamphlet 27-161-2)).
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J: 103 (Merits Judgment of June 27). The principle of distinction and the prohibition on
indiscriminate attacks have also been deemed basic principles of customary law by the UN
General Assembly. Respectfor Human Rights in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 18) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
87. See Meron, supra note 82, at 5 (discussing the grant of combatant status to guerrilla
forces in art. 44(3)-(4)).
88. H. GROTIUs, THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE bk. III, ch. XI, para. VII (1625) ("One
must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent death of innocent persons, even by accident."),
reprinted in 1 L. FRIEDMAN, THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3, 87 (1972).
89. See Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977, 8 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 106,
116 (1977) ("Nor did the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference at any time throw into doubt
the continued validity of thte] customary principle of distinction. ... ); Penna, Customary Law
and Protocol 1: An Analysis of Some Provisions, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS, supra note 51, at 206,
220 (art. 51(4) provisions relating to indiscriminate attack reflect customary international law);
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therefore look to these principles for guidance when interpreting article
1 of the American Declaration in the context of the bombing of the
Richmond Hill mental institution.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN DECLARATION'S
RIGHT TO LIFE PROVISION IN LIGHT OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW
The difficulty which is so acutely evident in Disabled Peoples' Inter-
national v. United States is not determining the existence of a customary
norm prohibiting the taking of civilian lives, but applying it to the
military action in Grenada during which sixteen civilian mental pa-
tients were killed. The key issue that the Commission will address is
whether the manner in which the United States pursued the operation
over Fort Frederick and Fort Matthew violated the prohibition on
attacks on civilians embodied in customary international law.
The information presented by the parties indicates that the aerial
attack which killed the mental patients could fall into one of four
categories: (1) a deliberate attack on civilians, (2) an indiscriminate
attack with civilian casualties, (3) a military mistake, or (4) a legiti-
mate military attack resulting in collateral injuries to civilians.
The first possibility is that the bombing by the A-7 aircraft was a
deliberate attack on a civilian object. As immunity of noncombatants
from willful attack is one of the most fundamental rules of the cus-
tomary law of armed conflict, such an attack should be considered a
violation of the right to life provision of the American Declaration. 90
It is improbable, however, that such a finding could be made against
the United States in this case. Correspondence from the United States
Department of State indicates that only after the air strike did the
United States learn that one of the buildings bombed was a mental
institution housing civilians. 9 1 Without a clear showing of intent, the
United States cannot be found to have deliberately attacked the civil-
ians in the Richmond Hill complex.
The second possibility is that the United States attacked in an
indiscriminate manner, without regard to possible civilian casualties.
Customary principles of humanitarian law state that an aerial attack
Solf, supra note 54, at 130 ("To the extent that Protocol I clarifies and implements the principle
of civilian immunity and the principle of distinction, its provisions should be considered
customary law."); Gasser, supra note 80, at 914 (Protocol I is a restatement of customary laws
of war).
90. See supra notes 57-64, 68-69 and accompanying text.
91. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Sept. 1984, supra note 10, at 3. DPI, however, asserts
"[e]veryone in Grenada knew what Richmond Hill was and that other disabled people were kept
at the Kennedy Home close by. United States diplomats had paid c[olurtesy calls at both
facilities for years." Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 6.
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which does not distinguish between civilians and combatants may be
evidence of a general intent to harm cirilians.
92
In order to prove an indiscriminate attack, the Commission must
find either that the bombing was not directed at a legitimate military
objective, or that the attack was of a type which could not have
distinguished between military and civilian objectives. 93 The United
States Department of State asserts in its correspondence that the
bombing was directed at Fort Frederick, which it considered a military
objective. DPI does not dispute that Fort Frederick was being used
by PRA forces and, in fact, concedes that soldiers had been stationed
within the complex. 94 The facts, as presently stated, seem to indicate
that Fort Frederick at least was indeed a legitimate military objective.
The United States Department of State also alleges that "[s]ome of
the fire came from the mental institution itself, into which armed
members of the PRA had moved. 95 A United States military publi-
cation states that the director of the mental institution reported that
at the time of the air strike, PRA troops had not only occupied the
mental institution to fire at United States forces, but had armed both
patients and staff as well. 96
Even if it were occupied by hostile forces, however, the mental
institution could be deemed a military objective only if it was being
used to make an effective contribution to the military action;97 United
States troops had no doubt that the civilian object was being used for
such a purpose;98 and the United States gave warning of its imminent
attack. 99 Whether PRA troops were inside the mental institution
presents a factual dispute, but the requirement of a warning was
clearly not fulfilled. 100 Without having given the requisite notice, the
United States would not have been justified in attacking the mental
institution even if it were a legitimate military objective.
Alternatively, the Commission may be able to prove an indiscrim-
inate attack by finding that the method used by the United States did
92. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. See also Solf & Grandison, supra note 55,
at 583.
93. See supra text accompanying note 72.
94. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 7: "Some soldiers had been stationed in what had
been offices of the hospital further up the hill about 300 yards from where the attack occurred
at the patient's [sic] dormitory."
95. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Sept. 1984, supra note 10, at 3.
96. Cypher, "Urgent Fury:" The United States Army in Grenada, in AMERICAN INTERVENTION
IN GRENADA: THE IMPLICATION OF OPERATION "URGENT FURY" 99, 106-07 (P. Dunn & B.
Watson eds. 1985).
97. See supra text accompanying note 73.
98. See supra text accompanying note 75.
99. See supra text accompanying note 78.
100. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 6.
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not adequately distinguish between military and civilian objectives. 101
The means by which the United States chose to subdue the forces
within Fort Frederick was an aerial bombing by a lone A-7 attack
aircraft.10 2 While aerial bombings are not known for their precision,
they are not in and of themselves considered indiscriminate attacks. 103
An argument could be made that if the United States had been aware
of the proximity of the mental institution to the fortress, it should
have attempted to subdue the enemy fire without risking civilian lives.
The United States could have, for example, used only infantry to
capture the enemy soldiers. Land combat might have partially elimi-
nated the imprecision that characterizes aerial bombing.
The obvious defense to this argument would be military necessity. 104
Absolutely no facts have been presented to indicate that the aerial
bombing was necessary to complete the overall military mission on
the island or even to save lives of those United States troops who were
allegedly under attack from PRA troops at Richmond Hill. Unknown
at this time is the number of PRA troops actually found within the
complex and how heavily these soldiers were armed. A determination
that the aerial attack was indiscriminate must be based on such further
fact-finding.
The third possible categorization of the attack would be as a military
mistake. 105 The United States reports that officers commanding the
intervention did not know which of the buildings was the alleged
PRA headquarters: "Only after the air strike did the United States
learn that one of the buildings from which PRA forces fired on U.S.
forces was a mental institution.'
' 0 6
DPI alleges that the United States knew or should have known that
the facility was a mental institution, rendering the bombing a negli-
gent and unjustifiable act. 107 DPI argues that the only soldiers on the
grounds of the mental institution at the time of the attack were fleeing
the fortress in search of shelter from the bombing and were not there
to attack United States forces.' 08 DPI concedes that some soldiers had
stationed themselves nearby in former hospital offices, but argues that
their presence did not justify an attack on the mental institution
itself. 10 9 The United States government asserts that the PRA had
101. See supra text accompanying note 72.
102. U.S. Officer's Briefing: New Report on Grenada, supra note 1.
103. See supra note 66.
104. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
105. Cypher, supra note 96, at 99.
106. Letter from U.S. Dep't of State, Sept. 1984, supra note 10, at 3.
107. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 6.
108. Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at 7.
109. Comments of DPI, supra note 16, at 7.
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raised a flag in front of the building as a rallying point for its forces. 110
No such flag, however, was found in the rubble of the mental insti-
tution after the bombing. I"'
Accidental and presumably negligent acts of bombing have been
the subject of compensation claims in the past. The International
Arbitral Commission noted "numerous international incidents ...in
which damages have been assessed for mistaken, unnecessary, indis-
crete or reckless action. 1 12 Legally, however, the Commission can hold
the United States responsible only if it finds that the United States
military officials negligently failed to verify that Fort Frederick was a
military objective. 3
The fourth possibility is that the bombing was a legally justified
attack on a military objective. United States forces may have attempted
to spare civilian lives as much as possible. The casualties suffered as a
result of the bombing may simply have been the unfortunate conse-
quence of an attack on a legitimate military target. There is no absolute
right of civilians to be free from injury during an armed conflict. If
the parties to the hostilities take all possible precautions and use
methods of warfare that conform to international standards, they
cannot be held responsible for any collateral damage.
A finding for the United States based on this fourth explanation,
however, is impossible without further factual investigation. If the
United States' action conformed with the above-mentioned duties,
then the Commission will have to find that the fatalities were non-
intentional, nonindiscriminate, and nonnegligent, and absolve the
United States from responsibility. Further information discoverable
through an on-site investigation is necessary to provide the Commis-
110. Cypher, supra note 96, at 104.
111. DPI asserts: "If any flag at all had been flown (there is much doubt that a flag actually
existed) it would only have been the Grenadan [sic] flag. No other flags were then in the area
and no other flags were found afterwards at Richmond Hill." Petition of DPI, supra note 1, at
7. Others state that Fort Frederick brandished a flag, though unidentifiable. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY,
GRENADA: REVOLUTION, INVASION AND AFTERMATH 106 (1984).
112. See The Kling Case, IV REp. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 575, 580 (1951) (citing the Dogger
Bank Case, 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 7-8 n.2 (3d ed. 1921) (Russia held
responsible to Great Britain for unjustifiably firing into a fishing fleet in the North Sea) and the
Stephens Case, Opinions of the Commissioners (Mexico-U.S. General Claims Comm'n) 397, 399
(1927) (Mexico held responsible to the United States for the reckless use of firearms by members
of the Mexican Guard causing the death of a U.S. citizen)).
The U.S. agreed to pay $964,199 to the Vatican for damage caused by bombs accidentally
dropped on Papal territory during World War II. I. BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
UsE OF FORCE BY STATES 146-47 (1963). In July 1961, the Grand Council of San Marino
accepted a British offer of £80,000 in compensation for the consequences of an Allied air raid
in 1944 in which fifty-nine persons were killed and forty-eight were injured. Id. at 147 n. 1.
113. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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sion with insight into the incident. 114 Traveling to Grenada, inter-
viewing those injured in the bombing, and discussing the operation
with those who experienced it first-hand could uncover reliable infor-
mation from which the Commission could make a decision.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights decided
in April 1986 that the DPI complaint against the United States was
admissible, it was the first time in the 27-year history of the Com-
mission that it had ever made an admissibility decision against the
United States. Since that time the Commission has rendered its March
1987 decision on both admissibility and the merits in the case of
Roach and Pinkerton v. the United States, holding that the United States
violates articles I and 2 of the American Declaration by permitting
the execution of juvenile offenders. 115 The admissibility decision in
the DPI case and the judgment in Roach indicate that the Commission
may be adopting a much more aggressive approach to allegations of
human rights violations by the United States. Indeed, the Commission
soon will have another opportunity to examine United States human
rights practices: the American Civil Liberties Union and others have
recently asked the Commission to consider whether the indeterminate
imprisonment of the Mariel Cubans is a violation of the American
Declaration. 116
In Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, the Commission
has taken on a matter which will present far greater factual and legal
difficulties than the Commission may have realized when it decided
in favor of admissibility. In order to decide the case on its merits, the
Commission must interpret the very simplistic language of the Amer-
ican Declaration's protection of the right to life in the unaccustomed
domain of international armed conflict. If the Commission proposes
to apply the American Declaration at all to a situation of armed
114. The Commission is well-equipped and well-qualified to perform on-site investigations,
and has done so successfully on many previous occasions. See e.g., Report on Situation of Human
Rights in Argentina, supra note 40, Report on Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua, supra note
40. Article 55 of the Commission's Regulations reads in part: "On-site observations shall be
carried out in each case [of petitions concerning states that are not parties to the American
Convention) by a Special Commission named for that purpose." Regulations, supra note 6, art.
55. See also Vargas Carrefio, The Experience of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HumAN RIGHTS 137 (B. Rameharan
ed. 1982) ("No other intergovernmental human rights organization has had the experience of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with regard to on-site observations.").
115. Roach, supra note 7.
116. Ferrer-Mazora v. United States, Case 9903 (United States), INTER-Am. C.H.R. (filed
Apr. 15, 1987).
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conflict, it must interpret the American Declaration in light of the
customary principles of humanitarian law.
Humanitarian law will not, however, resolve this case easily. At a
minimum, the Commission must also use its well-developed proce-
dures for on-site fact-finding to determine if the killing of the sixteen
mentally ill patients was intentional, indiscriminate, negligent, or
simply collateral damage in connection with a justifiable attack on a
military target. The facts surrounding the attack on the mental insti-
tution at Richmond Hill will be difficult to determine. Even if the
Commission is able to ascertain the relevent facts, it will need to use
great care in analyzing the applicable law. Disabled Peoples' International
v. United States will present the Commission with the very difficult
challenge of defining the limits of the right to life through an inter-
pretation of the American Declaration.

